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AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case  
for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication 
Stephen I. Vladeck† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than a dozen times in the past five Terms, the Supreme Court 
has reversed an appellate court’s decision granting post-conviction  
habeas relief to a state prisoner: not because it concluded that the state 
court had acted correctly, but because the state court’s error was neither 
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established  
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court,1 which is the standard 
of review prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA).2  Moreover, the Court decided all of these cases 
without clarifying which legal rules actually applied to the habeas  
proceedings, leaving central questions of constitutional criminal  
procedure unanswered. 
Emblematic of this trend is the January 2008 decision in Wright v. 
Van Patten,3 in which the Court summarily reversed4 a Seventh Circuit 
 
† Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  This Essay arose out of a 
panel at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, for my participa-
tion in which I owe thanks to Andy Siegel.  Thanks also to my co-panelists—Mike Allen, Amanda 
Frost, and Caprice Roberts—for their camaraderie and their comments, to Carolyn Robbs and the 
editorial staff of the Seattle University Law Review for their diligence and their patience, and to 
Nutan Patel for superlative research assistance. 
 1. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743 (2008) (per curiam); Utrecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 
(2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Rice v. 
Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005) (per curiam); Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 
(2005) (per curiam); Holland v. Jackson., 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (per curiam); Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam); Mitchell v. 
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam). 
 2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). 
 3. 128 S. Ct. 743. 
 4. I use the term here to mean a disposition that occurs on the merits at the certiorari stage, 
without the benefit of additional briefing or oral argument.  It is hardly exaggerating to suggest that a 
substantial percentage of the Court’s summary dispositions over the past decade (especially its 
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decision granting habeas relief based on the petitioner’s claim of  
ineffective assistance of counsel.5  Specifically, Van Patten claimed that 
his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because his lawyer  
participated in his plea colloquy by speakerphone.  Applying the two-
prong, circumstance-specific test for ineffectiveness enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,6 the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals rejected Van Patten’s claim, concluding that there was no  
evidence that the physical absence of his counsel resulted in prejudice.7  
On post-conviction habeas corpus, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin agreed.8 
The Seventh Circuit reversed,9 concluding that the Strickland test 
was the incorrect standard to apply to Van Patten’s claim, and that the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals should have instead applied the categorical 
presumption of ineffectiveness articulated in United States v. Cronic.10  
Because the state court’s error was not harmless, and because Cronic was 
unquestionably “clearly established” precedent, the Seventh Circuit  
concluded that habeas relief was warranted.11 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court took no position on whether 
Cronic or Strickland was the appropriate test to apply in such circum-
stances.  It merely noted that the answer to that question was unclear, and 
so it could not have been “contrary to or an unreasonable application of” 
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, for 
the Wisconsin state courts to apply the Strickland standard.12  Van Patten 
 
summary reversals) have come in cases like Van Patten—where the Court of Appeals held that post-
conviction habeas relief was warranted under AEDPA, and the Supreme Court reversed. 
 5. See Van Patten v. Endicott, 489 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 743.  
The Court had previously vacated the Seventh Circuit’s earlier decision in Van Patten v. Deppish, 
434 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2006), and remanded in light of its AEDPA-based decision in Carey v. 
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).  See Schmidt v. Van Patten, 549 U.S. 1163 (2007) (mem.).  On 
remand, the same panel reaffirmed its earlier decision, albeit with one dissent.  See Van Patten, 489 
F.3d at 828–29 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
 6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 7. See State v. Van Patten, 568 N.W.2d 653 (Wis. App.) (unpublished table decision), review 
denied, 576 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. 1997). 
 8. See Van Patten, 434 F.3d at 1041–42 (summarizing the background). 
 9. See id. at 1042–45. 
 10. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  Cronic was decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as 
Strickland, which may have contributed to the lower courts’ confusion as to what constituted 
“clearly established federal law” as determined by the Supreme Court. 
 11. Van Patten, 434 F.3d at 1045–46; see also Van Patten, 489 F.3d 827 (reaffirming the ear-
lier decision in light of Musladin). 
 12. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008) (per curiam) (“No decision of this 
Court . . . squarely addresses the issue in this case, or clearly establishes that Cronic should replace 
Strickland in this novel factual context.  Our precedents do not clearly hold that counsel’s 
participation by speaker phone should be treated as a ‘complete denial of counsel,’ on par with total 
absence.”) (citation omitted). 
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lost, in other words, not because there was no precedent, but because it 
was unclear which precedent applied. 
In a postscript to its brief opinion, the Van Patten Court agreed with 
Wisconsin’s argument that the Seventh Circuit could have reached the 
same result in a direct federal appeal, but emphasized that “[o]ur own 
consideration of the merits of telephone practice . . . is for another day, 
and this case turns on the recognition that no clearly established law  
contrary to the state court’s conclusion justifies collateral relief.”13  Put 
another way, even if the Court was convinced that the Seventh Circuit 
was correct—that Cronic is the appropriate test to apply in such cases—
it refused to say so, resting its decision on its belief that the Wisconsin 
state courts did not act unreasonably.14 
Van Patten is hardly alone in this regard.  Every year brings with it 
a new wave of scholarship attacking the deferential review called for by 
AEDPA,15 and new opinions by lower court judges expressing their  
frustration with the minimalist inquiry they are allowed to undertake in 
post-conviction habeas cases16—an inquiry centered on the reasonable-
ness of trial court errors, as opposed to the actual impact of those errors 
on the fairness or accuracy of the underlying proceedings.17 
 
 13. Id. at 747. 
 14. Indeed, Justice Stevens went so far as to suggest that the only reason why Van Patten was 
not entitled to habeas relief was because of a “drafting” error (that he, as the author of the majority 
opinion, made) in Cronic.  See id. at 747–48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  As Stevens 
explained, “In light of Cronic’s references to the ‘complete denial of counsel’ and ‘totally absent’ 
counsel, and the opinion’s failure to state more explicitly that the defendant is entitled to ‘the 
presence of counsel [in open court],’ I acquiesce in this Court’s conclusion that the state-court 
decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”  Id. at 748.  In other 
words, by simply omitting the words “in open court,” Cronic failed to clarify what it meant—that the 
physical absence of counsel triggered a categorical presumption of ineffective assistance.  See also 
id. (“The fact that in 1984, when Cronic was decided, neither the parties nor the Court contemplated 
representation by attorneys who were not present in the flesh explains the author’s failure to add the 
words ‘in open court’ after the word ‘present.’”). 
 15. For a small sampling, see John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The 
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 
(1998); Todd Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for “Reasonably Erroneous” 
Applications of Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2002); and Joseph M. Brunner, Comment, 
Negating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending Stare Decisis: AEDPA and Problems for the 
Article III Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 307 (2006). 
 16. See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007).  Although the panel in Irons 
concluded that circuit precedent precluded them from reaching the question of AEDPA’s 
constitutionality afresh, see id. at 854 n.5, two of the three judges penned concurrences bemoaning 
the extent to which AEDPA ties the hands of reviewing courts.  See id. at 854–59 (Noonan, J., 
concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially). 
 17. See id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially) (“Congress tells us in AEDPA that we 
may not grant relief to citizens who are being held in prison in violation of their constitutional rights 
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An equally constraining aspect of AEDPA warrants criticism.  In 
addition to affirming the deferential nature of review under AEDPA, the 
Supreme Court has concluded that only its holdings, not dicta,  
may provide the basis for relief under the statute.18  In other words, the 
Justices themselves pretermitted the possibility that, even while denying 
relief in AEDPA cases, the Supreme Court might still enunciate forward-
looking principles of constitutional law.  Because the Court can only 
grant relief under AEDPA if the result was foreordained by its prece-
dents, the federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, 
will never have the opportunity to make new law in cases in which 
AEDPA denies relief. 19  (That is, unless the reviewing court reached the 
error question first—a step that this article will argue is necessarily ante-
cedent to the question of whether the law providing the basis for the state 
court’s error was “clearly established” by the Supreme Court.) 
The effect of these two shortcomings—the Court’s decisions not to 
reach the issue of error where the lower court’s action survives 
AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, and the Court’s decision that 
only holdings and not dicta can provide the basis for relief under 
AEDPA—is significant.  Until the Court does reach questions like the 
one it avoided in Van Patten, criminal defendants across the country may 
be convicted using procedures suffering from the same identified (and 
litigated) constitutional defect.  And, because of AEDPA and the Court’s 
unwillingness to apply its holdings retroactivity, it will be all but  
impossible for those defendants to benefit from such a future Supreme 
Court decision unless their direct appeal is still pending when the later 
decision is handed down.20  For example, defendants convicted in the 
time between when Van Patten is decided (call it T0) and the hypotheti-
cal future case where the Court actually does reach the issue (call it T1) 
 
unless the constitutional error that led to their unlawful conviction or sentence is one that could not 
have been made by a reasonable jurist.”). 
 18. See Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  Because there were two different cases 
decided by the Supreme Court during its 1999 Term captioned “Williams v. Taylor,” the convention 
is to use the petitioners’ full names in identifying the cases.  See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., 
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1335–36 (5th ed. 2003). 
 19. That does not mean that relief is never warranted under AEDPA.  On a host of occasions in 
recent Terms, the Court has granted (or upheld a lower court’s grant of) relief in AEDPA cases 
because the underlying state court decisions were so inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.  
See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); 
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).  In each case, though, the 
majority opinion relied on prior decisional law—as AEDPA commands. 
 20. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a habeas petitioner may only invoke a “new 
rule” of criminal procedure—one formulated after his conviction—if the rule is a “watershed rule of 
criminal procedure,” or one that goes to the constitutionality of the substance of his conviction.  See, 
e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416–17 (2007). 
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will be unable to prevail in their habeas petitions on an argument similar 
to that advanced by Van Patten—that Cronic, and not Strickland,  
governs their claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  So even if it was 
unnecessary to reach the constitutional question in Van Patten’s case—
because he would lose under AEDPA anyway—the Court’s avoidance at 
T0 may well preclude relief for defendants convicted between T0 and T1. 
As the Van Patten Court itself suggested, the other obvious (and 
traditional) way around AEDPA would be for the Court to articulate the 
relevant substantive legal standard in the context of direct criminal  
appeals, in which AEDPA’s deferential standard of review does not  
apply.21  But as theoretically appealing as that option is, its practical like-
lihood runs squarely into the (shrinking) size of the Supreme Court’s 
docket,22 and the correspondingly small percentage of granted cases  
arising out of direct criminal appeals, especially criminal appeals from 
the state courts.23  In short, even a more concerted effort on the Justices’ 
part to hear direct criminal appeals from the state courts would at best  
mitigate, rather than obviate, the significance of the Court’s ability to 
enunciate new principles of constitutional law in the context of post-
conviction review. 
In other contexts, the Court has shown far less reluctance to reach 
questions of constitutional law even if they may not be necessary to the 
case sub judice.  Most familiarly, in the context of its qualified immunity 
jurisprudence, the Court for a time endorsed a rigid “order-of-battle” 
pursuant to which reviewing courts would decide whether the plaintiff 
had alleged a violation of a constitutional right before deciding whether 
that right was “clearly established,”24 or whether the officer was entitled 
to immunity.  That is, the courts were required to reach the “rights”  
 
 21. There is also a small class of cases where AEDPA does not apply to state prisoners 
collaterally attacking their convictions in federal court—usually because the underlying 
constitutional claim was not presented to the state court, and yet it was also not defaulted, or any 
default was excusable.  See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006).  That AEDPA does not 
constrain the federal courts’ powers in those cases, though, does not change the effect that forward-
looking pronouncements of constitutional law would have in AEDPA cases. 
 22. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of 
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking 
Docket, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 64; see also Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A1. 
 23. For a particularly good treatment of this issue, see Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, 
Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking 
Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008). 
 24. There is some debate about whether Congress in AEDPA meant to codify “clearly 
established” law as it was then understood in the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.  
Compare, e.g., Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.12 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.), 
with O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1998).  For present purposes, whether the 
terms are congruent or merely analogus is irrelevant. 
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question as a necessary antecedent to whether the defendant could be 
held liable.25 
Named the “Saucier sequence” for the 2001 decision that  
formalized it, this order of decision-making was the subject of substantial 
criticism from commentators, lower court judges, and even some of the 
Justices responsible for it.26  These critiques culminated in the Court’s 
January 2009 decision in Pearson v. Callahan,27 in which the Justices 
unanimously overruled Saucier.  As Justice Alito wrote for the Court, 
[W]hile the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it 
should no longer be regarded as mandatory.  The judges of the dis-
trict courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise 
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the 
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 
circumstances in the particular case at hand.28 
At the heart of the critiques that led to Saucier’s overruling in  
Callahan are a series of inter-related concerns: that Saucier required 
courts to unnecessarily decide questions of constitutional law; that such 
decisions were often “cert-proof” if the defendant prevailed on qualified 
immunity grounds anyway; that it forced courts to decide constitutional 
questions on underdeveloped factual records; and so on.  Although the 
Court opined that courts generally should reach the rights question first 
in qualified immunity cases, the tide of scholarly opinion seems to  
support the Court’s rejection of the mandatory methodological approach 
that Saucier commanded.29 
This Essay suggests that many of the same reasons why Saucier 
proved so controversial—and perhaps even unworkable—in qualified 
immunity cases are less salient in the context of post-conviction habeas 
corpus, where the value of reaching potentially unnecessary questions of 
constitutional law far outweighs the cost.  Put another way, my thesis is 
that, even though the Saucier sequence is no longer mandatory in  
qualified immunity jurisprudence, such a rigid methodological order of 
battle would be of great utility in the context of post-conviction habeas 
corpus—and in the adjudication of “new” rules of criminal law more 
 
 25. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 
(2009). 
 26. See, e.g., Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 817–18 (citing cases and articles). 
 27. 129 S. Ct. 808. 
 28. Id. at 818. 
 29. To be fair, as I note below, there are certainly scholars and jurists who support the Saucier 
approach.  But as much as they are in the minority, my goal in this essay is not to ask whether they 
have the better argument, but to ask instead whether Saucier’s approach might have greater utility 
(and fewer shortcomings) in the context of post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA. 
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generally.  In that context, this Essay argues, the case for rights-first  
constitutional adjudication is far stronger. 
To elaborate upon this argument, Part II begins with a brief descrip-
tive overview of the Supreme Court’s post-conviction habeas corpus  
jurisprudence, focusing on the particular significance of “new” rules of 
criminal law, and their applicability.  Part III introduces the Court’s 
qualified immunity case law, and explores both the origins of the Saucier 
sequence and the growing criticisms of the rights-first approach that led 
to its overruling this Term in Callahan.  Finally, Part III turns to whether 
the Saucier sequence could be extrapolated into the context of post-
conviction habeas corpus, considering both why it might work, and  
the counterarguments against it.  Ultimately, as this Essay concludes, 
although AEDPA’s deferential standard of review crystallizes the  
problem that federal courts face in post-conviction habeas cases today, 
the need for rights-first adjudication in that context actually predates the 
1996 statute—and will survive any legislative attempt to repeal it. 
II. “NEW” CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Before turning to the particular complexities added by AEDPA, a 
brief survey is warranted of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence with 
respect to post-conviction relief (through both direct appeals or habeas 
corpus), without which it would be difficult to understand the stakes 
when the Court declines to reach questions of constitutional significance 
in criminal cases. 
A. Retroactivity and the Problem of New Rules30 
As the conventional wisdom goes, the Supreme Court first began 
seriously grappling with the extent to which new constitutional rules 
should apply retroactively in criminal cases in the early 1960s.31  The 
timing makes sense in several respects, since the Court had begun (1) 
endorsing a more robust view of the scope of federal habeas corpus  
review of state court convictions;32 and (2) embracing a far broader view 
of the relevant constitutional protections that might apply to state-court 
proceedings in the first place.33 
 
 30. Much of the discussion that follows is derived from the treatment of retroactivity in  
habeas corpus in FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1325–35. 
 31. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036–37 (2008). 
 32. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
 33. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 
U.S. 23 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 
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The issue of retroactivity for post-conviction relief was first  
confronted in the 1965 case of Linkletter v. Walker.34  The Linkletter 
Court enunciated a three-part test, holding that the retroactive effect of a 
new rule of criminal law “should be determined on a case-by-case basis 
by examining the purpose of the rule, the reliance of the States on the 
prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive 
application of the rule.”35  Although Linkletter was a habeas case, the 
Court later expanded its holding to encompass direct criminal appeals as 
well36—meaning that, under the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, the same 
rule for retroactivity applied to a defendant whose direct appeal was still 
pending as to a defendant whose appeal had become final, but who sub-
sequently invoked the same claim in a post-conviction habeas petition.  
So long as the relevant legal development post-dated the defendant’s 
conviction, the standard was the same. 
Justice Harlan (the younger) disagreed with this approach.   
He wrote separately in a series of cases to argue that the Linkletter test 
was unworkable and that the relevant standard should instead be a bright-
line distinction between direct appeals and post-conviction claims.37  
Culminating with his dissent in Desist v. United States,38 and his separate 
opinion in Mackey v. United States,39 Justice Harlan argued that the 
Court’s decisions should apply “retroactively” to all cases where the  
defendant’s direct appeal was still pending, but should not generally  
apply retroactively via post-conviction habeas petitions.  Emphasizing 
the significance of “finality,” Justice Harlan suggested that the only  
exceptions in habeas cases should be where the petitioner attacked the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted,40 or “for 
claims of nonobservance of those procedures that, as so aptly described 
by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, are ‘implicit in the  
 
(1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  This list is hardly exhaustive, and a series of decisions 
incorporating other provisions of the Bill of Rights predated the Warren Court.  But it should go 
without saying that the incorporation of much of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments 
against the states dramatically expanded the scope of claims that could give rise to meritorious post-
conviction federal habeas petitions. 
 34. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
 35. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1036–37 (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629). 
 36. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 
(1966). 
 37. Justice Harlan concurred in Linkletter and its progeny: “I thought it important to limit the 
impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in principle.”  Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 38. See id. at 258 (“[I] can no longer . . . remain content with the doctrinal confusion that has 
characterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter principle.  ‘Retroactivity’ must be rethought.”). 
 39. 401 U.S. 667, 675–702 (mem.) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and  
dissenting in part). 
 40. See id. at 692–93. 
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concept of ordered liberty.’”41  Otherwise, according to Justice Harlan, 
habeas courts should consider only whether the petitioner’s trial was 
constitutional based on the law as it then existed. 
The Supreme Court would ultimately embrace Justice Harlan’s 
views in the late 1980s.  The first facet of Justice Harlan’s argument—
that new rules should be retroactively enforceable in all cases where the 
direct appeal was still pending—was adopted by the Supreme Court  
in 1987 in Griffith v. Kentucky.42  Two years later, and quite controver-
sially,43 a plurality of the Court adopted the second facet of Justice  
Harlan’s approach—that new rules generally should not be retroactively 
enforceable via habeas corpus—in Teague v. Lane.44  Although Justice 
O’Connor’s defense of that approach largely reiterated Justice Harlan’s 
rationale from Desist and Mackey, her analysis added two additional  
layers.  First, she reasoned that in habeas cases the Court should reach 
the retroactivity of a new rule as a threshold matter, before deciding 
whether there should even be such a new rule.  In her words: 
Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a 
new constitutional rule of criminal procedure is applied to the  
defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice  
requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly  
situated.  Thus, before deciding whether [there should be a new 
rule, we should ask] whether such a rule would be applied  
retroactively to the case at issue.45 
Second, while recognizing that “[i]t is admittedly often difficult to 
determine when a case announces a new rule,” Justice O’Connor adopted 
a definition of what constituted a new rule that was far broader than any 
reading the Court had previously employed: 
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or  
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.  
To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was 
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s  
conviction became final.46 
 
 41. Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 42. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 43. On the controversy surrounding Teague, see EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE 
RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 498–510 (2005). 
 44. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  A majority would soon endorse the plurality’s approach.  See  
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1032 n.1 (2008) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
313 (1989)). 
 45. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–01 (plurality opinion). 
 46. Id. at 301 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
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As later cases would clarify, the “dictated by precedent” standard 
meant, as a practical matter, that even the most modest extensions of  
existing precedent would be new rules—and therefore not generally  
retroactively enforceable via habeas corpus—if any reasonable jurist 
might have found the extension unwarranted.47  Thus, Teague simultane-
ously converted into new rules most decisions extending previously rec-
ognized rights into new contexts, and suggested that courts should not 
enunciate such new rules unless it would matter in the case sub judice.48  
Seven years before AEDPA, then, Teague raised substantial hurdles to 
the enunciation of new principles of constitutional law in criminal  
cases.49 
B. AEDPA, “Clearly Established” Federal Law, and the Order of Battle 
The story behind AEDPA’s enactment in 1996 has been well-told 
elsewhere.50  As relevant for purposes of this Essay, AEDPA rewrote 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 to provide that 
[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .51 
On its face, the biggest shift wrought by AEDPA was its require-
ment that the baseline of federal law be “clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Arguably, 
Teague had already crafted something akin to the “clearly established” 
requirement in its sweeping reformulation of the idea of new rules, but 
Teague had pointedly not limited the relevant body of precedent to just 
the decisions of the Supreme Court.  To the contrary, the lower courts 
continued to routinely apply circuit-level precedents in habeas cases in 
the period between Teague and AEDPA. 
 
 47. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 
(1990). 
 48. Whether Teague mandated such an order of battle has divided the lower courts.  See Cam-
piti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 321 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 49. Needless to say, the Court was soundly criticized for doing so.  Although the literature is 
voluminous, a particularly significant contribution is Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). 
 50. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15. 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996). 
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Furthermore, the new § 2254(d) raised a question of statutory  
interpretation that divided early courts: What does it actually mean for a 
state court decision to be “contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law”?52  The Court took up 
this question in Terry Williams v. Taylor, decided in April 2000.53 
1. Terry Williams v. Taylor and Dicta About Dicta 
At issue in Terry Williams was whether the petitioner had received 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyers 
failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence during 
the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial.  Although six Justices 
agreed that Williams’s Strickland claim was meritorious under AEDPA, 
the six divided over what kind of showing the new § 2254(d) required. 
Justice Stevens—writing in dissent on behalf of himself and Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—interpreted § 2254(d)(1) as not altering 
the pre-AEDPA standard of independent, de novo review of federal con-
stitutional questions.  As Justice Stevens explained, 
[I]t is significant that the word “deference” does not appear in the 
text of the statute itself.  Neither the legislative history nor the  
statutory text suggests any difference in the so-called “deference” 
depending on which of the two phrases [“contrary to” or “unreason-
able application of”] is implicated.  Whatever “deference” Congress 
had in mind with respect to both phrases, it surely is not a require-
ment that federal courts actually defer to a state-court application of 
the federal law that is, in the independent judgment of the federal 
court, in error.54 
Writing for a majority as to the appropriate standard of review,55 
Justice O’Connor opined that AEDPA had to be understood as changing 
the law, especially in light of the congressional intent behind the statute.  
Suggesting that Justice Stevens’s opinion “fails to give independent 
meaning to both the ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses 
of the statute,”56 Justice O’Connor concluded that “[i]f a federal habeas 
court can, under the ‘contrary to’ clause, issue the writ whenever it  
 
 52. See, e.g., Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 
751 (5th Cir. 1996); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d on other 
grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 
 53. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 54. Id. at 386–87 (Stevens, J.) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868. 
 55. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed with Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy that Williams was entitled to relief under AEDPA, they agreed with Justice 
O’Connor’s articulation of the standard of review under AEDPA.  Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 416 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 56. Id. at 404 (O’Connor, J.). 
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concludes that the state court’s application of clearly established federal 
law was incorrect, the ‘unreasonable application’ clause becomes a  
nullity.”57  Instead, Justice O’Connor concluded that the “contrary to” 
prong of § 2254(d)(1) contemplated relief only in those cases where the 
state court’s decision was squarely in conflict with extant Supreme  
Court precedent.  Otherwise, the question devolved to the “unreasonable 
application” prong, under which “a federal habeas court may not issue 
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 
law erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must also be  
unreasonable.”58 
Toward the end of her opinion, Justice O’Connor added a point that 
had not been addressed by Justice Stevens.  Without any citation, Justice 
O’Connor observed that where § 2254(d)(1) refers to “clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 
it “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s  
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”59  In other 
words, in what could only be described as dicta itself, Justice O’Connor 
stated that only the holdings of the Supreme Court could form the basis 
for habeas corpus relief under AEDPA, and nothing else.  Expressions 
about what the law should be, even if unanimous, would mean nothing if 
they were completely unrelated to resolution of the merits of the appeal.  
Thus, if the reviewing court concluded that the state court’s decision was 
not “unreasonable,” nothing the same court said about the merits could 
subsequently form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA. 
2. Andrade and the Order of Battle 
Notably, Justice O’Connor’s opinion omitted any discussion about 
the decisional order of battle in AEDPA cases—whether courts could 
first reach whether the state court’s decision was erroneous before  
assessing whether the error was reasonable.  Such an omission was  
significant, given that reasonable jurists could certainly structure their 
decisions in a way where resolution of the error question was not dicta, 
but was instead necessarily antecedent to the question of entitlement to 
relief under AEDPA. 
Less than a month after Terry Williams was decided, the Ninth  
Circuit answered the question of whether courts could first reach error in 
the affirmative, relying on the Court’s (pre-Saucier) qualified immunity 
 
 57. Id. at 407. 
 58. Id. at 411. 
 59. Id. at 412. 
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jurisprudence for support.  As Judge Reinhardt wrote for the panel in 
Van Tran v. Lindsey, 
Requiring federal courts to first determine whether the state court’s 
decision was erroneous, prior to considering whether it was contrary 
to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under 
AEDPA, promotes clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence 
and also provides guidance for state courts, which can look to our 
decisions for their persuasive value.  Such a rule also respects our 
duty, as Article III judges, to say “what the law is.”  Accordingly, 
we hold that, when analyzing a claim that there has been an unrea-
sonable application of federal law, we must first consider whether 
the state court erred; only after we have made that determination 
may we then consider whether any error involved an unreasonable 
application of controlling law within the meaning of § 2254(d).60 
The Ninth Circuit was the only circuit court to mandate such a two-
step analysis after Terry Williams.61  Two other circuits, the Fourth and 
the Fifth Circuits, squarely rejected that approach,62 whereas the First 
and Second Circuits held that it was permissible, but not mandatory, to 
reach the question of error first.63  In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme 
Court sided with the First and Second Circuits, holding that “AEDPA 
does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology in 
deciding the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1)—whether a 
state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable  
application of, clearly established federal law.”64 
Thus, due to Andrade, the federal courts are allowed, but not  
required, to reach whether the state court committed error before decid-
ing whether that error was unreasonable.  Nevertheless, in the six years 
since Andrade was decided, the vast majority of AEDPA cases have seen 
adjudication similar to that undertaken by the Supreme Court in Van  
Patten; in cases where it was not strictly necessary to reach whether the 
state court committed error—cases where any error was not  
 
 60. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also id. 
at 1155 n.17 (“The method we adopt does not require that we render advisory opinions.  As the 
Court’s reasoning in County of Sacramento makes clear, we cannot make a determination that a 
decision is contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 
without implicitly commenting upon what the state of the law is.  Given that we must necessarily 
resolve questions of federal law whenever we address a habeas petition under AEDPA, it behooves 
us to do so clearly and explicitly.”) (citations omitted). 
 61. See Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, 1044 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 62. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 954 n.19 (5th Cir. 2001); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 
149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 63. See Kruelski v. Conn. Super. Ct. for the Judicial District of Dansbury, 316 F.3d 103 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 64. 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 
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unreasonable—courts have generally rested their decisions solely on the 
reasonableness prong of § 2254(d)(1).  With no compulsion to reach the 
error question first, there has simply been no incentive for courts to  
expend precious resources in cases where such analysis does not make a 
difference.  Instead, as in Van Patten, criminal defendants are left to their 
direct appeals, and their direct appeals only, to pursue claims based on 
new law. 
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE SAUCIER SEQUENCE 
Although civil suits against government officers for damages—
where qualified immunity defenses typically arise—are quite distinct 
from habeas cases, there are significant similarities between resolution of 
qualified immunity and AEDPA relief.  Like post-conviction habeas  
cases under AEDPA, a defense of qualified immunity to a damages  
action against a government officer generally turns on two questions: 
whether the officer’s alleged conduct violated a right held by the  
plaintiff, and whether that right was clearly established such that a  
reasonable officer should have known that his conduct was unlawful.65  
And, as in AEDPA cases, the officer will prevail if the answer to either 
question is no.  Thus, qualified immunity cases, in the abstract, raise  
similar issues concerning the ordering of judicial decision making and 
the possibility that the relevant substantive law will be “frozen” by  
judicial reliance on the non-rights prong in denying relief in the vast  
majority of cases. 
For a time, the Supreme Court’s approach in qualified immunity 
cases resembled the approach that it appeared to endorse in AEDPA 
cases in Andrade—favoring resolution of the rights question first, but not 
requiring as much.  As Justice Souter explained in County of Sacramento 
v. Lewis,  
the better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of quali-
fied immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has 
alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.  Normally, it is 
only then that a court should ask whether the right allegedly impli-
cated was clearly established at the time of the events in question.66   
This ordering was preferable, Justice Souter explained, because “if the 
policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified 
immunity whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of 
 
 65. The contemporary standard for qualified immunity has its origins in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 66. 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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primary conduct, standards of official conduct would tend to remain  
uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individuals.”67 
Three years later, at the end of its 2000 Term, the Court mandated 
such a methodology in Saucier v. Katz.68 
A. Saucier 
Although the question presented in Saucier turned on the particular 
complexities of assessing qualified immunity defenses in excessive force 
cases, Justice Kennedy began his opinion for the Court by emphasizing 
that the purpose of a qualified immunity defense—to resolve the officer’s 
immunity at the earliest possible stage of the litigation—requires  
reviewing courts to first ensure that the plaintiff has alleged the violation 
of a constitutional right before reaching whether that right was clearly 
established, and whether the officer is therefore liable.  As he explained, 
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must 
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most  
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show 
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?  This must be 
the initial inquiry.  In the course of determining whether a constitu-
tional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find 
it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a 
holding that a right is clearly established.  This is the process for the 
law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our  
insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitu-
tional right as the first inquiry.  The law might be deprived of this 
explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question 
whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was 
unlawful in the circumstances of the case. 
If no constitutional right would have been violated were the  
allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries 
concerning qualified immunity.69 
Thus, to Justice Kennedy, rights-first adjudication served the dual pur-
poses of allowing for “the law’s elaboration from case to case,” and po-
tentially allowing for the resolution of suits challenging official action at 
an earlier stage, to spare the officer from the cost of further litigation. 
 
 67. Id. (also noting that “[i]n practical terms, escape from uncertainty would require the issue 
to arise in a suit to enjoin future conduct, in an action against a municipality, or in litigating a  
suppression motion in a criminal proceeding; in none of these instances would qualified immunity be 
available to block a determination of law”). 
 68. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 69. Id. at 201 (citation omitted). 
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Curiously, though, Justice Kennedy offered no explanation in his 
opinion for why it was necessary to mandate such an approach,  
as opposed to the approach adopted by the Court in earlier cases—of  
preferring such a methodology as the better approach in most cases.   
Certainly, in cases where the scope of a constitutional right was unclear, 
it would be far less taxing for the court—and the litigants—to simply 
grant qualified immunity on the ground that the law was not clearly  
established than to first clarify the law. 
Such an omission is all the more inexplicable given that, in her 
concurrence in the judgment, Justice Ginsburg suggested that excessive 
force cases were one of the few sets of cases where such a two-step  
analysis did not make sense: 
[P]aradigmatically, the determination of police misconduct in  
excessive force cases and the availability of qualified immunity 
both hinge on the same question: Taking into account the particular 
circumstances confronting the defendant officer, could a reasonable 
officer, identically situated, have believed the force employed was 
lawful?  Nothing more and nothing else need be answered in this 
case.70 
Yet, although Justices Stevens and Breyer joined in Justice  
Ginsburg’s concurrence, none of them objected to adoption of the two-
step sequence in other contexts, or to the notion that rights-first  
adjudication would usually serve the beneficial purpose of developing 
constitutional doctrine, even in cases where the officers ultimately were 
entitled to immunity.  The fault line, instead, turned simply on whether 
the Saucier sequence was to apply in all cases. 
B. The (Growing) Criticisms of the Saucier Sequence 
Very quickly, however, the inflexibility of the so-called “Saucier 
sequence” became a lightning rod for lower court judges, commentators, 
and even the Justices themselves.  Perhaps foremost among the critics 
has been Justice Breyer, beginning in Brosseau v. Hagan,71 and culmi-
nating with his concurrence in Scott v. Harris: 
 
 70. Id. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
 71. See 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he current rule rigidly re-
quires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is available an 
easier basis for the decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case before 
the court.  Indeed when courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order of battle’ makes little administra-
tive sense and can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulated from  
review.  For these reasons, I think we should reconsider this issue.”) (citation omitted). 
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Sometimes (e.g., where a defendant is clearly entitled to qualified 
immunity) Saucier’s fixed order-of-battle rule wastes judicial  
resources in that it may require courts to answer a difficult  
constitutional question unnecessarily.  Sometimes (e.g., where the 
defendant loses the constitutional question but wins on qualified 
immunity) that order-of-battle rule may immunize an incorrect  
constitutional ruling from review.  Sometimes, as here, the order-of-
battle rule will spawn constitutional rulings in areas of law so fact 
dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity.  And 
frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that older, wiser judicial 
counsel “not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless 
such adjudication is unavoidable.”  In a sharp departure from this 
counsel, Saucier requires courts to embrace unnecessary constitu-
tional questions not to avoid them.72 
Justices Stevens and Scalia have joined in Justice Breyer’s  
critiques,73 and most lower court judges have been equally unabashed in 
their evaluations, both on74 and off75 the bench.  Moreover, in addition to 
the particular concerns raised by Justice Breyer, lower court judges have 
noted the difficulty of resolving constitutional questions on an  
underdeveloped (if not completely undeveloped) factual record, given 
that defendants are often allowed to take an interlocutory appeal from 
pre-trial denials of qualified immunity.76 
Finally, in academic circles, a host of commentators have decried 
Saucier as the most egregious in a growing body of federal court  
decisions opening the door to unnecessary judicial decisions on constitu-
tional questions—a pattern that raises serious policy concerns, and that 
 
 72. 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Morse v. 
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and  
dissenting in part) (making a similar argument). 
 73. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007) (Stevens, J.,  
concurring in the judgment); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1019–20 (2004) (Stevens, J.,  
respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 1022–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of  
certiorari). 
 74. See, e.g., Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Pear-
son v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007); Ehrlich 
v. Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dep’t, 315 F.3d 65 
(1st Cir. 2002).  For a particularly thorough—and widely cited—discussion, see Lyons v. City of 
Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 582–85 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 75. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1275 (2006). 
 76. On the appealability of denials of qualified immunity, see Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 
299 (1996), and Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).  For the difficulties appellate courts face 
deciding such claims on skimpy records, see Lyons, 417 F.3d at 582 (Sutton, J., concurring), and 
Wong v. U.S. I.N.S., 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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perhaps may even implicate constitutional values.77  Although the criti-
cism of Saucier has hardly been unanimous,78 the momentum in favor of 
abandoning the Saucier sequence led to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pearson v. Callahan, where it unanimously decided that Saucier should 
be overruled.  Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court was unhesitating in its 
criticism of the mandatory approach to resolving qualified immunity  
cases.79  Nonetheless, the Court was careful to suggest that it was still 
preferable, in the run of cases, for courts to reach the rights question first.  
As Justice Alito explained, “Our decision does not prevent the lower 
courts from following the Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that 
those courts should have the discretion to decide whether that procedure 
is worthwhile in particular cases.”80 
Although I have my own views on the Court’s decision in  
Callahan, the point of this Essay is to consider whether something akin 
to Saucier’s methodology might make more sense in AEDPA cases,  
regardless of Callahan’s abrogation of such an approach in qualified 
immunity cases.  To that end, my remaining focus is on whether the  
various critiques of Saucier have lesser force in the context of post-
conviction habeas. 
C. Exporting the Saucier Sequence to AEDPA Cases 
To briefly recap from above, we might summarize Justice Breyer’s 
objections to Saucier as encompassing three distinct concerns, and the 
objections by lower court judges as adding a fourth: (1) that Saucier  
required courts to reach constitutional questions that were otherwise un-
necessary to resolve the case before them; (2) that Saucier led to “cert-
proof” judgments because defendants had little-to-no incentive to appeal 
adverse constitutional rulings when they prevailed on immunity grounds 
anyway; (3) that Saucier spawned incredibly fact-specific constitutional 
holdings in areas where idiosyncrasies of individual cases reduce the 
value of precedent; and (4) that Saucier required reviewing courts to  
decide constitutional questions on sparse factual records. 
The “sparse-record” critique is readily disposed of in the context of 
post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA, since the statute requires 
 
 77. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
847 (2005). 
 78. See, e.g., John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitu-
tional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999); Sam Kamin, 
An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued 
Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53 (2008); Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-
Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539 (2007). 
 79. See 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–18 (2009) (summarizing the criticism of Saucier). 
 80. Id. at 821. 
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that the federal constitutional claim be fully and fairly presented to the 
state courts.  As a result, the problem of an underdeveloped record 
should be nonexistent in post-conviction cases. 
Justice Breyer’s concerns, on the other hand, require a bit more 
consideration.  With regard to his second concern with the problem of 
cert-proof judgments, one response may be that in AEDPA cases, it is 
only Supreme Court precedent that can form the basis for relief.  As 
such, it will usually be the Supreme Court itself that pronounces such 
forward-looking principles, decisions that are, by definition, not cert-
proof.  As for the lower courts, they are only allowed to look to (and  
apply) extant Supreme Court case law as a basis for relief.  Although it is 
certainly possible that the lower courts will commit error simply in  
applying previous and well-established Supreme Court precedents, such 
a possibility is far more remote than in the qualified immunity context, 
where appellate courts are free to apply their own precedents as well.  
Accordingly, the concern with cert-proof objections is legitimately  
diluted in the context of AEDPA cases. 
Justice Breyer’s third concern—that Saucier requires the formula-
tion of constitutional law in cases with highly specific fact patterns,  
leading to idiosyncratic constitutional rules—is certainly also an issue in 
AEDPA cases.  Even focusing only on Sixth Amendment ineffective  
assistance of counsel claims, claims of specific misconduct by attorneys 
may well lead to highly fact-specific applications of the Strickland rule, 
as typified in the Court’s recent decisions in Wiggins v. Smith81 and 
Rompilla v. Beard.82  But it is probably uncontroversial to note that the 
range of idiosyncratic—and yet constitutionally material—facts in post-
conviction cases is far narrower than the comparable range in damages 
cases.  Put simply, there are far fewer rights for state courts to violate in 
a criminal trial than there are for a state officer to violate in everyday 
contact with citizens at large.  Again, my point is not that these concerns 
disappear altogether in the context of AEDPA cases; rather, it is that 
these concerns have at least somewhat less suasion. 
Another larger point bears emphasizing, especially as it relates to 
Justice Breyer’s first—and the most widely-shared—critique of Saucier, 
i.e., that a rigid order-of-battle requires courts to unnecessarily reach 
constitutional questions.  There is no doubt that, on the surface, this  
concern is at least as present in AEDPA cases as in qualified immunity 
cases where the law is not clearly established and relief is thus  
foreclosed.  However, there is an obvious and vital distinction between 
 
 81. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 82. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
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the two bodies of law.  In qualified immunity cases, a failure to enunciate 
a principle of constitutional law at T0 does not mean that an officer who 
commits similar conduct at T1 has acted lawfully; rather, it means only 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages for the officer’s transgression.  
The plaintiff may still pursue other non-monetary remedies against the 
officer, and the officer may well face disciplinary action for his offense.83 
In AEDPA cases, in contrast, a failure to enunciate a particular 
principle at T0 will usually bar any form of relief or remedy altogether, 
and so a defendant who might otherwise have been entitled to a new  
trial—if not to outright release—remains incarcerated.  Put another way, 
there is at least a colorable argument that the failure to enunciate  
forward-looking principles in qualified immunity cases does not forever 
enshrine what the relevant officer did, whereas a similar failure in 
AEDPA cases does insulate the state court from any repercussions for its 
failure to reach the “correct” result.  Thus, what is unnecessary in the 
context of civil-rights damages actions may be absolutely necessary in 
the context of other criminal defendants facing incarceration or even  
execution, and the canonical reliance on the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance may be quite myopic. 
Thus, the most common critiques of the Saucier sequence have less 
force when applied to post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA.  
Moreover, as discussed previously, there are compelling reasons to  
import the rigid order-of-battle prescribed by Saucier into the context of 
post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA, and even those that fall out-
side of AEDPA but nevertheless implicate Teague’s retroactivity  
analysis.  So long as the relevant court has the power to reach the merits 
of the petitioner’s habeas claim, I believe it has an obligation—not just to 
that petitioner, but to similarly situated criminal defendants whose claims 
have not yet ripened—to identify constitutional errors even when those 
errors cannot form the basis for relief. 
D. Counterarguments 
That is not to say that there are not compelling counterarguments  
to my thesis—and from both directions, at that.  For starters, it is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s own precedent because the Court  
specifically disavowed such an approach in Andrade, which abrogated 
the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Van Tran.  Under Andrade, habeas 
courts are free to reach the state court’s error first; they are just not  
required to do so.  Thus, for my thesis to work, it would require the Court 
 
 83. See, e.g., Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 822; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 841 n.5 (1998). 
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itself to change course and reconsider its brief discussion of this point in 
Andrade.84 
Second, and relatedly, is the question of why the Andrade standard 
is insufficient.  If courts are free to reach error in AEDPA cases before 
reaching the reasonableness of the error, why compel—rather than  
encourage—them to do so?  This was the Callahan Court’s central  
argument against Saucier, and I suspect it is also the strongest counter-
weight to the proposal I have advanced herein.  The short answer is an-
ecdotal: since Andrade was decided, the vast majority of courts just ha-
ven’t reached the error question first in cases where it has not  
mattered.  Some judges do, to be sure, but the decision whether or not to 
formulate forward-looking principles of constitutional law hardly seems 
like the kind of responsibility that we should leave to the discretion of 
the judge, or to the vagaries of which judges end up deciding which  
cases. 
Third, a rigid order-of-battle in AEDPA cases would unquestiona-
bly increase the workload on already-overworked district judges, who are 
already overburdened, and who might not take kindly to the  
burden of resolving questions unrelated to the disposition of the case  
before them.  As noted by Justice Alito in Callahan, a strict order-of-
battle “sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial 
resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the 
case. . . . District courts and courts of appeals with heavy caseloads are 
often understandably unenthusiastic about what may seem to be an  
essentially academic exercise.”85  On the other hand, there might be a far 
more compelling reason to impose such a burden in habeas cases than in 
damages lawsuits, given that the court’s opinion may well prove  
dispositive in a host of cases not then pending. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In a way, this is a strange Essay, for it is meant to mitigate the  
impact of a statute that the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed by 
adopting an approach that it has specifically rejected.  It should go  
without saying that part of the motivation is my own distaste for the  
deferential review mandated by AEDPA in an area where the Court had 
already done quite a lot to tip the scales in the state courts’ favor. 
 
 84. Of course, Congress could amend AEDPA to require such an approach, but I assume for 
purposes of this Essay that AEDPA remains on the books as is.  If the 111th Congress chooses to 
revisit AEDPA, I suspect that the order-of-battle would be the least of its concerns—and that the 
AEDPA-centric argument I make in this Essay would quickly become moot. 
 85. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 
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That being said, my goal is rather modest.  I do not mean to suggest 
a wholesale reconceptualization of the purpose(s) of post-conviction  
habeas corpus, or to identify a magic bullet to solve the difficult  
questions arising from the formulation of new rules in criminal cases and 
their retroactive application, or even to suggest that the rule for which I 
am arguing has any constitutional underpinnings.  Rather, the purpose of 
this Essay is merely to suggest that, owing to a combination of the  
language of AEDPA and to the Court’s own development of its habeas 
corpus jurisprudence, the substantive merits of habeas cases matter even 
when they are not dispositive, and the Supreme Court’s avoidance of 
resolving constitutional questions comes at the specific and concrete  
expense of future criminal defendants whose liberty turns not on what 
the law actually is, but on when it is finally pronounced.  This is a trap 
that the Supreme Court has set for itself, and one that it can maneuver 
out of with little in the way of doctrinal displacement.  My proposal—
that the Supreme Court should export the now-rejected Saucier sequence 
into the context of AEDPA cases—is hardly a perfect solution, or one 
that would come without substantial costs to lawyers and judges alike.  
But if cases like Van Patten are any indication, such a model of rights-
first constitutional adjudication is immensely preferable to the status quo. 
